133 amounts to about five per cent of the total area, and even that is limited to the narrow strips of river valleys and the small scallop-edged fans of the delta at the river mouths. The widest of these valleys scarcely exceeds five miles.[4]

B. Rivers

133
731 The section of the Yellow River in East China has contributed immensely to the river's reputation as a troublesome and unreliable waterway: (1) it is the last of the river's capricious changes of course; (2) it has an alarming capacity for silt accumulation, about 10 centimeters per year; and (3) as it is, the bed at places is already about 2-8 meters. (6-17 ft.) above the level of its banks.[5] Under these circumstances, the river has long been a threat to the inhabitants of the area. As of early 1955, there were dikes on the lower reaches totaling 1,300 kilometers (806 mi.)

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4. Cressey, op. cit., p. 337; Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Fen-sheng Ti-t'u [The Atlas of the People's Republic of China by Provinces], Shanghai, Ti-t'u ch'u-pan-she, 1953.

5. Wang Ming-yeh, "Huang-ho liu-yü ti shui-t'u liu-shih yü shui-t'u pao-ch'ih kung-tso" [The Erosion and Water Conservation Work in the Yellow River Area"], Ti-li Chih-shih [Geographic Knowledge], February 1955, p. 67.

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133 in Shantung Province and in Honan Province
• 731 to the west. These dikes stand 1.5-2.5 meters (3.5-8 ft.) above the highest known flood level. Another flood-diversion project, at the river mouth, has also been completed, and the Peking regime claims complete elimination of flood threat on this stretch of the Yellow River. The current is swift as it nears the ocean, and only above Lo-k'ou is it slow enough for river-junk traffic.[6]

Other rivers in Shantung Province are minor ones, except for the I River and the Shu River, which issue from T'ai-shan Mountain and flow southeast into Kiangsu Province. Major flood control and prevention work
503 has been done on these two rivers. The Yün-ho [Grand Canal] connects the Yellow River with a number of small lakes and cuts southeast to reach Hangchow in Chekiang. This man-made waterway, which is divided into several sections, changes direction wherever it meets a lake or another river.[7] The section of the canal which extends from Chen-chiang in Kiangsu to Hangchow in Chekiang is navigable for small steamers all year round; north of

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6. Ko Sui-ch'eng, Chung-kuo Ti-li Hsin-chih [New Geography of China], Shanghai, Chung-hua shu-chü, 1940, p. 67.

7. Ch'en Shih-chien, Chung-kuo Ti Ho-liu, [China's Rivers], Peking, San-lien ch'u-pan-she, 1950, pp. 67-72.

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657 747 On November 9, 1943, China became a member of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). The Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA) was established in January 1945 as a department of the Nationalist Government on the ministerial level, as was the China Office of UNRRA. In co-operation the two administrations planned and worked on the gigantic problems of relief and rehabilitation in postwar China.[4] Despite the great contribution to Chinese welfare resulting from the efforts of peaceful projects of this sort, the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was eliminated by the Chinese Communist when they became the rulers of Mainland China.

II. CALAMITIES SINCE 1949

731 Since the establishment of the Communist regime in China, many natural disasters have occurred. Droughts, floods, locust and insect invasions, frost, windstorms, and hail-storms have caused famines which began in the rural districts and spread throughout the nation.

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4. China Handbook 1937-45, pp. 538-41.

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731 An anti-Communist source[5] has given the following estimate of the number of people in China adversely affected since 1949 by natural calamities, climaxed by the great flood of 1954.

1949	60,000,000
1950	38,000,000
1951	28,000,000
1952	33,000,000
1953	47,000,000
1954	180,000,000

No region has escaped entirely from these disasters. If there are differences among them, they are negligible.

As if these natural calamities were not disastrous enough, the people on the mainland of China suffered further abuse from man-made adversities, such as the Land Reform Movement, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, the war in Korea, and the government's "planned purchase" of agricultural products. The number of people who have been affected by the Communist quest for power is estimated to have been

5. Kung-fei Ti Chiu-chi Kung-tso [Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists], Section 6 of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, Taipei, 1955, pp. 5-6. It should be noted that source references originating in Taipei are almost invariably sponsored by the Chinese Nationalist Party. As well as being anti-Communist in intent, they may sometimes serve as a media for pro-Nationalist propaganda.

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731 as high as 90,000,000 during the first four years of the Communist regime.[6]

The northern section of East China including Shantung, northern Anhwei, and northern Kiangsu suffered alternately from drought, insects, and flood. The usual cycle seemed to be spring and early summer droughts followed by insect invasions, and floods in the autumn. In 1952, according to one estimate one fourth of the population (10,000,000) in Shantung Province suffered from famine, and in Anhwei Province there were 24,000,000 famine refugees.[7] Excessive rainfall in the same year brought floods to the southern part of East China, including southern Kiangsu, Chekiang and Fukien.[8] Anhwei Province, a part of which extends into the Hwai River valley, was again one of the most gravely stricken regions during the flood of 1954, which the Communists themselves termed "historic."[9]

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6. Ibid.

7. P'ien-ti Tsai-huang Ai Ta-lu [Widespread Calamities on the Continent], Taipei, 6th Section of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, 1952, pp. 26-27.

8. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

9. Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Dec. 19, 1954, p. 1.

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731 As to man-made disasters, one report claims that during five years of Communist control more than 200,000 people lost their lives in Shanghai alone through such Communist drives as the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns and the counterrevolutionary purges. Another 640,000 of the city's population are reported to have been jailed or sent to labor camps.[10]

III. COMMUNIST RELIEF AND WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS

746 Following the Hwai River flood of 1949, the Central Relief Committee was formed (February 1950) under the Government Administration Council as a temporary but integral part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Later, similar committees were set up in the provinces and municipalities. Their existence, on the whole, has been in name only, according to an anti-Communist report, and it is asserted that they have accomplished little relief work.[11]

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10. Ch'un-mo Luan-wu Ti Shang-hai-shih [Shanghai Where the Demons Dance in Confusion], Taipei, 6th Section of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, 1954, p. 38.

11. Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists (pp. 5-6), published in Taipei, lists all the welfare organizations described in this study. Reference to the same organizations are to be found in Jen-min Shou-ts'e [People's Handbook], 1955, a Chinese Communist source.

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746 Outright relief was the least significant clause in the scheme.[22] Generally speaking, the same principles were applied to rural relief programs in combating natural calamities. Under the slogan of "famine-relief-through-economy," the people were advised to economize, "to substitute unprocessed food for processed foods," to use ersatz foods, and to adulterate grain, presumably with leaves and bark.[23]

731 746 When the chairman of the Production Relief Committee of the East China Military and Political Committee made his report in 1950, he stated that floods, drought, insect invasion, hail, typhoons and snow in the region during the preceding year had made 16,000,000 people refugees, and more than 4,000 were dead from 746 starvation. The same report announced that hundreds of thousands of wells had been sunk and repaired for the prevention of drought in Shantung, embankments and dikes had been repaired and built for the prevention of flood in Anhwei, and many miles of sea wall were reenforced in southern Kiangsu. Apparently these preventative measures also served as work relief projects. It also reported that water conservation works, the chief means of work relief, had called for the mobilization of 630,000 refugees in northern Anhwei, 1,400,000

22. Ibid., pp. 52-60.
23. Ibid., p. 50.

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746 refugees in northern Kiangsu, and 700,000 in Shantung.[24] During the same year, 190,000,000 refugee laborers were mobilized in Anhwei and northern Kiangsu to build and repair embankments along the Yangtze and Hwai rivers.[25]

[731] Drought also struck Fukien Province in 1954. For relief, the provincial government earmarked JMP$2,400,000 (US$960,000) new currency in 1955, particularly for the three southern coastal administrative districts of Min-hou, Chin-chiang, and Lung-ch'i. The emergency directive stressed that the local authorities must guide the people to carry out production and spring plowing for "self-salvation."[26]

The Shantung provincial government also reported that many households . that province were in danger of starvation in 1954, especially in the Yellow River and Grand Canal flooded area The central government appropriated relief funds equivalent to US$12,400,000 for the genera relief of Shantung.[27]

24. Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Vol. II, No. 4, Peking, Aug. 15, 1950, pp. 819-820.

25. Jen-min Shou-ts'e 1950 [People's Handbook 1950], Peking, 1950, Section [7] keng p. 20.

26. Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, No. 1054, Supplement, May 24, 1955, p. 17.

27. Ibid., p. 21.

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249 433 of oil-bearing crops throughout all regions. The projected national goal of an increase of 53.7 per cent in 1954 over the production in 1952 was reported by Li Fu-ch'un in the first Five-Year Plan. [31]

VIII. FISHERIES OF EAST CHINA

228 433 Because of its long coastline and numerous streams and lakes, East China is especially rich in both salt-water and fresh-water fish resources.

Of the principal fishing areas of Kiangsu and Chekiang, Chou-shan (Chusan) is the most famous. Over 10,000 fishing boats gather near the Chou-shan Island each spring to catch many different species of fish. The goal set for 1955 is 6,400,000 shih-piculs (352,000 tons), [32] approximately four and a half times that of 1949.

Kiangsu and Chekiang have abundant fresh-water-fish resources; Kiangsu has 1,173.7 million shih-mou (195.6 million acres) of river area and 1.6 million shih-mou (266,667 acres) of lake area, while Chekiang has a combined river and lake area of over 2,000,000 shih-mou (over 400,000 acres). A tremendous quantity of fish is caught each year.

IX. WATER CONSERVATION IN EAST CHINA

731 For many centuries the Hwai River and its tributaries have been the main sources of flood

30. Economic Bulletin, Hong Kong, Ching-chi Tao-pao She, Mar. 17, 1953, #310, p.16.

31. NCNA, Peking, July 11, 1955.

32. People's China, Peking, Feb. 1, 1955. p. 13.

731 in East China. The Chinese Communists began to harness the Hwai River in 1950. The essential projects included (1) the building of the San River Regulator, (2) the excavation of new diversion canals, one at Po-kang and two near Wu-ho, and (3) the building of Fo-tzu-ling Reservoir on the P'i River and Mei-shan Reservoir on the Shih River.[33] The above-mentioned water-conservation projects are said to be finished except for Meishan Reservoir, which is to be completed during the first months of 1956,[34]

Other projects included the dredging of the channel of the Hwai River and its 70-odd tributaries as well as many minor projects, all of which were completed during the period 1950-55. An estimated 36.4 million shih-mou (6.06 million acres) of land in northern Kiangsu, Anhwei, and Shantung provinces have benefited from the completion of these projects.[35]

Other flood-prevention projects in East China, including the building of a new 190-kilometer channel of the I (Yi) River, a 14-kilomet canal joining the Shu and Sha rivers, and another canal joining the I (Yi) and Shu rivers were completed before 1952.[36]

243
731 In 1950, a good harvest of maize was gathered on 7,500,000 shih-mou (1,250,000 acres)

33. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Vol. XVIII, No. 22, June 2, 1955, p.702.
34. People's China, February 1, 1953, pp. 14-15.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., June 16, 1953, p. 18-24.

243 of farmland in the Hwai-yin region southwest of
739 Lo-ma Lake. In 1951 and 1952, good harvests were reported throughout the basin of the two rivers, and not a single mou of land was flooded. The agricultural production of northern Kiangsu region[37] was 20 per cent higher in 1952 than in 1951.

X. CONCLUSION

423 One of the most striking features of East China's land reform was the promulgation of a series of orders extending favorable treatment to families of overseas Chinese residing in the rural districts of Fukien Province. The Communists hoped to stimulate the investment of remittances from foreign countries in agricultural and industrial enterprises in China. The inequality of treatment for peasants of the same district tends to arouse a great deal of discontent among the peasants in the East China Region, especially those in Fukien Province, who have no relatives overseas.

After land distribution, the basic problem in the Chinese rural communities still remains as before -- too many people and too little land. Mao Tse-tung admitted in July 1955 that the average per capita land-holding is still very small-only about 3 shih-mou (1/2 acre) per capita for the country as a whole. In some areas of East and Central-South China it is as little as 1 shih-mou (1/6 acre). Mao hopes to organize these scattered small farmers into units for semi-collective farming called agricultural producers'

~~Improved~~

731 Water conservation projects in this
24/ region[1] have been responsible for some progress in agricultural production. Although thousands of lives were sacrificed during construction, some fruitful results have been achieved. Evidence for this assertion can be found in the three good harvests between 1951 and 1953 recorded in Kiangsu. The Communist regime, with little consideration for human welfare, accomplished these tasks at the expense of the rural masses.

[1] [i.e. East China. -- Analyst]

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466 overemphasized by the Chinese Communists to camouflage another type of forced labor. Millions of civilians have been recruited by the government to join gigantic public projects such as water-conservation works and highway and railway construction, where mass-labor methods are needed in underdeveloped China. The most-talked-about example of mass labor methods is the Hwai River Project.

II. HWAI RIVER PROJECT

A. Origin of the Project

731 663 The Hwai River, 1,021 kilometers in length and covering an area of about 220,000 square kilometers in Honan, Anhwei, and Kiangsu provinces, had afflicted the people in this region since the fourteenth century.

In 1938, the Kuomintang government diverted the Yellow River to prevent the Japanese army from advancing west from Hsuchou. The diversion choked the main Hwai River and most of its tributaries with silt, causing the water brought down by the Yellow River from Shensi and Kansu to flood the whole Hwai region. After the war the Nationalist Government, under the direction of the American engineer, O. J. Todd, put the Yellow River into its old bed, but it was too

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73/653 late to prevent the big flood of 1949, which covered 53,000,000 mou (about 8,000,000 acres) of land and made 16,000,000 people homeless, and of this number 700,000 died of starvation and disease.[8]

The People's Government of Communist China decided to harness the river after the flood. By a directive known as "Decisions on the Harnessing of Hwai River"[9] issued by the Government Administration Council on Oct. 14, 1950 a Committee was established to direct the work which was started in November of the same year. The entire undertaking was to be completed in 1955.

B. Recruitment of Labor

466/653 According to the directive mentioned above and some others[10] issued by the

8. Kung-jen Jih-pao [Workers' Daily], Peking, Oct. 28, 1952, p. 4.

9. Chung-yang Ts'ai-ching Cheng-ts'e Faling Hui-pien [Compilation of Laws and Regulations of the Central Government Concerning Financial and Economic Policies], Peking, compiled by the Financial and Economic Committee of the Government Administration Council, Peking, March , 1952, Vol. III, pp. 1084-86.

10. Hua-tung-chu Ts'ai-cheng Ching-chi Faling Hui-pien [Compilation of Laws and Regulations Concerning Finance and Economics in East

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466 653 Because of the bad working conditions and the lack of nourishment and proper medical care, the mortality rate among the workers of the Hwai River Project reached 10 per cent in 1951.[21]

E. Achievements of the Hwai River Project

731 653 The first stage of the Project was completed in 1953, including the strengthening of 2,100 kilometers (1,302 miles) of dikes, drendging 860 kilometers (533.2 miles) of river beds, constructing one water storage reservoir, 12 water detention basins, and 92 sluices. Altogether 200 million cubic meters (6,554 million cubic feet) of earth work had been completed.[22]

An official source stated that the total area of inundation in 1950 was only 60 per cent of that flooded in 1949, in 1951 it was 21, and by September 1952, it was only 8 per cent.[23]

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21. Chang Chao-feng, op. cit., p. 71.
22. Kung-jen Jih-pao [Workers' Daily], October 8, 1952, p. 4.
23. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Oct. 9, 1952, pp. 455-56.

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653 Fu Tso-yi in his report on the water conservation work, said that the Hwai River Project covered 280,000 kilometers (about 173,986 miles) of area, no serious flood was reported in 1954, and the Tientsin-P'uk'ou Railway Line had not been interrupted as before. Altogether 2,900,000,000 cubic meters (95,033 million cubic feet) of earth work had been completed by the laborers with their bare hands. Hsü Kai, director of the Bureau of Surveying and Planning of the Ministry of Water Conservation, affirmed that the work of the Hwai River Project had passed the test of the second highest watermark of the flooding river in 1954.[24]

All the reservoirs and detention basins constructed on the river and its tributaries by the end of 1954 were capable of storing 16,500 million (540,705 million cubic feet) cubic meters of water and protecting 2 million hectares (about 2,47 million acres) of farmland from attack of flood and drought.[25] The latest Communist report said that most of the important parts of the first stage of the Hwai River Project, including the Fo-tzu-ling and Nan-wan reservoirs,

24. Jen-min Shou-tse [People's Handbook], Peking, 1955, pp. 513-15.

25. NCNA, Penpu, July 3, 1954; quoted from Survey of Mainland China Press, Hong Kong, No. 842, July 5-7, 1954, p. 40.

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731/653 had been completed in July 1955.[26]

All the reports from Mainland China and some from Hong Kong praised what the project had done for the improvement of living conditions of the people in the Hwai River area. Such reports imply that the millions of peasants who continue to toil on the banks of the river for a few bowls of rice a day have no reason to complain.

III. "REFORM-THROUGH-LABOR" IN EAST CHINA

A. Reform-through-Labor Camps in Shanghai

697/466 As a result of the drive for suppression of counterrevolutionaries which started in the Spring of 1951 and the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns which followed, the number of prisoners sentenced to reform-through-labor reached 200,000 in Shanghai by the end of that year. Reform-through-labor camps are scattered all over the suburbs of the big city. Most of the prisoners are employed in municipal constructions, road building, and light industries. The following is an example given by the Communists through the official channel New China

26. Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, Aug. 5, 1955, p. 2.

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silt.[5] A foreign resident writing in 1915 took a gloomy view of the city's future because he considered that six storeys was the maximum possible for buildings on this site.[6] These problems have been overcome, at considerable expense, by floating the taller buildings on concrete rafts in order to provide a stable foundation adequate to support structures which would otherwise sink into the alluvium. Until the first experiment with this method in the building of the new Shanghai Club in 1910, large buildings had been set on wooden pilings driven into the silt, and great care was necessary to prevent unequal settling. Shanghai's twenty-storey hotels and public buildings, erected during the 1920's and 1930's, float on their concrete rafts in this jelly-like subsoil, a scant 800 miles from the major earthquake belt running through the Japanese islands, but fortunately in the hundred-year history of the foreign settlements, no serious shocks have occurred.

Surface drainage has also been a constant problem in the development of modern Shanghai. The original site[7] (adjoining the walled Chinese city — map 6) as the British found it in 1842 was a typical agricultural landscape of the Yangtze delta: wet rice paddies and dry cotton fields, crisscrossed by creeks and canals, and with occasional clusters of family villages. This land was subject to frequent floods at high tides by the tidal inflow of water from the Yangtze and the resultant backing up of fresh-water outlets (primarily Soochow Creek and the Whangpoo), and until recently it was still flooded nearly every year in late summer by typhoon winds from the east and accompanying heavy rains. The land within the metropolitan area was gradually raised by filling to permit the building of roads and houses. Filling was easier and cheaper than artificial drainage for all but the swampiest areas and proved adequate for the growth of the city, but it was accomplished only at a considerable expense of money and energy.

The commercial core of the city, concentrated along the Whangpoo frontage, remained regularly subject to flooding. One of the first public works projects to be carried out under the Communist administration (which has attempted to make Shanghai a showplace of efficiency as an advertisement of the virtues of the new regime) was the filling of the lowest places in this downtown area, particu-

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larly its major commercial artery, Nanking Road, which follows fairly closely the course of a small creek culverted early in the period of foreign occupance (map 6). It was thus one of the most frequently flooded areas in the city. Paving along this heavily traveled street through the heart of the hotel and retail district was removed for nearly a mile back from the river, and replaced after the ground level had been raised sufficiently to protect it from all but the worst floods.

The numerous tidal creeks (map 6), characteristic of the lower delta, were useful in the early days of the Settlements as master drains and for demarcating legally and defending militarily Settlement boundaries. They were also used for carrying off sewage, where their tidal ebb was an advantage, and for movement of goods within the city and to and from the hinterland. The so-called Defense Creek at the western limit of the British Settlement of 1848 (map 6) was culverted and covered with a roadway in 1906, a few years after the Settlement had reached its greatest areal extent in 1899, but the Yang Ching Pang, which formed the boundary between the French and International Settlements on the south, remained an open sewer and transport artery until 1915, when as an enclosed culvert it was covered over with a broad boulevard named Avenue Edward VII as a gesture of ideological if not political unity between France and Great Britain. The remaining uncovered creeks are still important transport arteries, and as such key factors in the economic life of the city. While Shanghai has at least to this extent turned its delta site to advantage (and in a largely unique way as we shall see below), the problems which the delta has presented far outweigh its benefits.

The City

The site of the original British Settlement, on the left bank of the Whangpoo at its confluence with Soochow Creek, was determined by the existing walled Chinese city just upstream, whose trade had attracted British interest in a concession there (map 6). Soochow Creek, the original natural and later canalized waterway to the leading delta city of Soochow for which Shanghai served as the port, was the primary factor fixing the Chinese city, and it was

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504 or seventh in rank among world ports, in terms of annual net registered tonnage entered and cleared, points to its characteristic role as a delta port. The trade of the Yangtze basin requires a major outlet to the sea, and Shanghai, despite its poor site, offers the only practicable deep-water harbor near the mouth of China's greatest trade highway, the Yangtze River.

504 731 The harbor has a few advantages. At latitude 31° 10′ and where it is also influenced to some extent by the warm Kuroshio, or Japan Current, Shanghai is the northernmost port on the China coast to be free from ice at all seasons in most years. This gives it an advantage over the two leading ports of north China, Tsingtao and Tientsin, where floating ice is usual for parts of January and February. Location fourteen miles up the Whangpoo gives the harbor protection from typhoons, which are a significant menace to shipping in all south China ports during late summer. Shanghai averages about one typhoon annually, but with the adequate warning provided and the degree of protection afforded by its up-river location, damage to shipping is never more than negligible. In the period before the growth of the foreign city, this inland location was also important as a measure of protection against frequent coastal raids by Japanese and Formosan pirates. Finally, fog adequate to delay shipping in the harbor or in the approaches in the Yangtze estuary is quite infrequent.

503 Prophecies of Shanghai's isolation from maritime shipping by the seaward growth of the delta have not been lacking at any period in the history of the modern city. As each new difficulty arose however, means were found to overcome it, for the advantages of the city's location have greatly outweighed the disadvantages of its site and have made extensive dredging worthwhile. There is no reason to believe that the undoubted accumulation of silt, especially on the Fairy Flats, during the war and post-war years will present an insuperable problem once dredging is resumed. The great volume of water discharged by the Yangtze into the sea and the scouring action of tidal currents will assure some kind of channel in the estuary on which dredging can concentrate. The neglect of dredging over such a long period may make it necessary to relocate the main ship channel, but what dredging has accomplished before it can accomplish